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Mecca and the birth of commercial bingo 1958–70: A case study
Carolyn Downs*
Centre for the Study of Gambling, University of Salford, Manchester, UK
The game of bingo has become synonymous with women of a certain age and
class and has been stigmatised as a dead-end use of leisure. However, the
development of commercial bingo in the wake of the Betting and Gaming Act
(1961) offered the leisure industry access to a new and lucrative market. While
many major players in the leisure industry of the early 1960s adopted commercial
bingo as an adjunct to their offerings the Mecca dancing group adopted a strategy
that made bingo so particularly their own that the brand rapidly became known
as the bingo and dancing group with Eric Morley of Mecca referred to in the
popular press as ‘Mr Bingo’. This paper provides a case study of the Mecca group
as it moved into commercial gambling, rapidly increased its size and profitability,
saw off competition in commercial gambling from larger companies and finally
succumbed to a lucrative takeover in 1970.
Keywords: Mecca; corporate strategy; branding; leisure industry; gambling
Introduction
Whilst there is a widespread acknowledgement amongst those who write about
gambling that the activity has an extraordinarily long history, there has been little
investigation of the significance of the similarly lengthy history of commercially
organised gambling. The commercialisation of gambling over the period 1800–1960
was hampered by prohibitive legislation that made commercial gambling a lucrative
feature of the black economy.1 However the development of an early leisure
industry, exemplified by the nationwide spread of music hall chains from the middle
of the nineteenth century, and mirrored by small-scale but lucrative commercial
gambling, developed apace and can be seen to have accelerated in the period after
1850 (Chinn, 1991; Clapson, 1991; Downs, 2009; Golby & Purdue, 1984; Kift, 1991).
It has been noted that there is a relationship between the demand for leisure time
and the growth of commercial leisure (Jackson & Weed, 2003; Owen, 1969, 1971;
Tribe, 1999). However, commercial leisure in industrial society was not seen as a
serious topic for academic study until Pimlott’s pioneering The Englishman’s Holiday
(1947) which documented the changing relationship between the seaside, holidays
and social class in Britain. This juxtaposition of social history and commercial leisure
was further developed by John Walton with his seminal study The Blackpool
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landlady: A social history (1978), followed by his several major contributions to the
place of holiday and leisure in the lives of the working classes. A serious
consideration of the history of gambling as leisure (always quasi-commercial even
when largely illegal) was first attempted by Ross McKibbin (1979, 1998) who clearly
articulated the class-based nature of betting in the inter-war period, with Roger
Munting (1988, 1996), Mark Clapson (1991) and Carl Chinn (1991) adding to the
canon with accounts that mainly concentrated on aspects of betting in a class-based
context, although Munting does provide a short overview of bingo as a numbers
game successfully commercialised. Bingo has not figured largely in social histories of
leisure, perhaps because it is seen as a minority pursuit. However, the British
Gambling Prevalence Survey (Gambling Commission, 2007) found 10% of women
who gambled played bingo, and the numbers appear to have been much higher in the
period 1950–75, with a large proportion of players from social classes C2, D and E
(Dixey, 1996). Given the attraction of the game to significant numbers of women it is
perhaps surprising that sociologists have been sparing in their attention. The
exceptions are Rachel Dixey and Margaret Talbot’s studyWomen, Leisure and Bingo
(1982) and Faith Freestone’s short monograph on the future of the licensed bingo
industry post 1993 (after the National Lottery) and the impacts of bingo on the lives
of players and staff in licensed bingo clubs. These important works do not provide
any account of the rise of commercial bingo in the 1960s or the place of bingo as part
of a diverse leisure industry in the UK though, nor of the particular place of Mecca
in the process of developing and codifying this element of the commercial gambling.
Commercial mass leisure is an interesting topic for the business historian, offering
the opportunity to juxtapose the social history of the working classes with the
development of business models based upon the discretionary spending power of the
masses with their pennies and shillings. Recent scholarship on the music hall (Kift,
1991), the pub (Clark, 1983), dance halls (Nott, 2002) the seaside (Walton, 1978,
1983, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2007) have developed social histories that are
inter alia business histories. This account of an enterprise that began as a sub-section
of the Mecca entertainment brand but rapidly developed to become an activity
synonymous for the company is an attempt to develop further and make explicit the
relationship between business history and the development of popular commercial
leisure.
In inter-war Britain there was a huge growth in demand; both for leisure time and
for activities to fill that leisure time, met by an increased range of commercially
provided products and facilities. New or expanded forms of commercialised leisure
included the cinema, football pools, dance halls, bowling, greyhound racing and the
holiday camp, all of which were incredibly popular with the masses. During this
period existing forms of mass leisure such as the working class seaside holiday were
further developed with the advent of holidays with pay allowing increasing numbers
of the working classes to access a week away (Walton, 1994, p. 25) and making
investment in the business of pleasure for the masses an increasingly attractive
proposition (Walton, 1983, pp. 178–179). In the post-war boom years increasing
disposable incomes accelerated the development of commercial leisure at resorts and
also in urban areas. Although contemporary commentators largely disapproved of
the increasing commercialisation of leisure (Labour Party Manifesto, 1959;
Rowntree & Lavers, 1941) the masses voted with their money and increasingly
bought into the idea of leisure as a commodity. This lead to a range of new





























brands such as Mecca, Butlins, Rank, Littlewoods and Forte that remain household
names after seven decades in the leisure industry.
Commercial gambling
Gambling as a form of commercial leisure offers a leisure experience that has the
potential to provide a real thrill; giving punters the feeling that they are taking part in
an activity that is out of the routine and potentially life-changing (Downs, 2008;
Reith, 1999). At the same time it is also a commercial opportunity and one that Mecca
was well-placed to exploit when the legislative restrictions surrounding commercial
gambling were relaxed on 1 January 1961. However, the domination of commercial
bingo by the Mecca brand was not a foregone conclusion. The leisure industry
landscape in the 1950s had many significant players. A number of these could have
provided competition to Mecca; with Littlewoods or Butlins the leisure companies
most likely to have been picked out as potential commercial gambling operators.
The attraction of gambling is such that even when gambling was largely illegal in
the UK participation rates were substantial (Kemsley & Ginsberg, 1951). In the de-
cades since Kemsley and Ginsberg calculated a past year gambling rate of around 70%
many new forms of leisure have developed. However, the most recent UK study
returned a prevalence rate of 68% (Gambling Commission, 2007). This figure is not
too dissimilar to that established in the work of Kemsley and Ginsberg; suggesting a
strong cultural attachment to the pursuit. Given the popularity and profitability of
gambling, the commercialisation of the pursuit has not attracted much academic
attention from business historians, perhaps reflecting Walton’s assertion that ‘business
history seems not to engage much with popular culture’ (Walton, 2010, p. 10).
Commercial bingo, though, has from its very first appearance on the mass leisure
market caused moral panic, seeming to epitomise the ‘dead-end use of leisure’
(Downes, 1976, p. 46). The Times castigated bingo as ‘that cretinous pastime’ (The
Times, 14 September 1961) and for many commentators the sight of queues of mainly
women in town centres, waiting to gamble represented what Walton has eloquently
described as:
Crowded, noisy, vulgar, unbuttoned, uninhibited enjoyment, for better or worse. They
epitomised carnival, saturnalia, the temporary triumph of the periphery over the core,
the world turned upside down, the suspension of dignity and inhibitions, the temporary
reversal of the civilising process, the reign of gluttony, extravagance and licentiousness.
(Walton, 2004, p. 51)
The level of press condemnation of bingo may in fact be behind the decision of the
companies with established gambling interests not to exploit the opportunity to move
into commercial bingo. In the case of bingo, although a number of football pools
companies had national brands from the mid-1920s, even in the 1960s they were
concerned to highlight the respectability of the pursuit (Downs, 2009). Similarly,
although some significant leisure providers had operated quasi-commercial bingo
from 1947, including Butlins, these companies also signally failed to exploit their
experience in the area after the legalisation of commercial gambling, simply continuing
their existing games for holidaymakers with the bonus that they could keep the
substantial profits instead of donating them to charity. However, although casinos and
bingo became an important element of the portfolio of interests of several national





























the Betting and Gaming Act (1960), it is the speed and effectiveness of Mecca’s move
from non-involvement in commercial gambling to leading provider of commercial
gambling, ahead of experienced rivals and larger competitors, that is instructive in
considering how businesses can exploit new opportunities effectively.
Mecca management impact
It is acknowledged that companies with effective management teams that actively seek
to capitalise on openings in the market immediately after they appear are those most
likely to expand; in 1961Mecca fitted this description (Child, 1974; Ramo´n Rodrı´guez,
2002; Tribe, 1999). The leisure industry is peculiar for experiencing both rapid growth
and concentration of ownership; a pattern seen in music halls, cinemas and dance halls
before commercial bingo was developed and that continues to be apparent in the
development of theme pubs and package holidays (Baum & Mudambi, 1994; Kift,
1996; Lafferty & von Fossen, 2001). Despite concentration of ownership, leisure is a
far less predictable industry than other industries. The novelty effect of a new activity
boosts demand to unprecedented levels and companies that hope to succeed have to be
aware of the trends and have the capacity to respond rapidly (Taylor, 1992). Leisure is
a sector that suits market domination by large groups. The larger the group the greater
the degree of diversity possible, and this in turn both offers the company a chance to
respond rapidly to new leisure demands and protects the company from the inevitable
and rapid declines in demand as tastes change. In many ways the leisure industry is
similar to other sectors; companies in the leisure industry want profitability and
growth, positive cash flow and increasing dividends. In other ways though the leisure
industry operates in a significantly different type of marketplace; demand is
extraordinarily variable across sectors of the leisure industry and also, as a service
industry, it is particularly vulnerable to decline during periods of economic recession.
It was not gambling but dancing that provided the foundations of the Mecca
group of companies. Mecca established a chain of dance halls with attached catering
interests during the 1930s, and continued to expand provision even through the war,
becoming the largest group involved in the provision of commercial dance venues.
During this period Mecca diversified (maximising the benefits of vertical integration)
buying companies that provided amongst a range of products and services, musicians,
music publishing, dance floors and dance hall fittings, catering and catering supplies
(Nott, 2002). In addition Mecca developed a range of different leisure venues includ-
ing dance halls, ice rinks, ten-pin bowling and banqueting suites (Nott, 2002, p. 161).
There was a concentration on ensuring that for every major element of the supply
chain required for operating the venues Mecca owned that another part of the Mecca
family of companies could offer goods or services. There is nothing to indicate that
left to their own devices, and with a successful and expanding chain of ballrooms, ice
rinks, music and catering interests, Mecca would have shifted into the slightly raffish
world of commercial gaming. The catalyst for the commercial exploitation of the
public desire to gamble was the fortuitous combination of Mecca, Eric Morley (1918–
2000) and the Betting and Gaming Act (1960).
Eric Morley
From the very start of commercial bingo in 1961 press reports refer to Eric Morley





























‘Mr Bingo’ by the popular papers. Morley had seen how popular the game could
be when he served as an entertainments officer in the army during World War II
and had organised many housey-housey games (also known as tombola and lotto
in the services). After being de-mobilised in 1946 Eric Morley took charge of
publicity at Mecca; rapidly gaining a reputation as a man with commercial vision
and a knack for predicting the next big thing. Morley got on well with the self-
made joint-chairman of Mecca, Carl Heiman. Heimann had arrived in Britain in
the 1920s as an almost penniless immigrant from Denmark. He had tremendous
chutzpah, wearing a smart coat and mingling with first class passengers as he
disembarked in London so as to avoid questioning by officials on his immigration
status and lack of funds with which to support himself. The Mecca brand that
Heimann successfully established and maintained through the difficult war years
was pushed into the limelight in 1949. It was then that Morley instigated the
popular television show, Come Dancing, in partnership with the BBC. He insisted
that the amateur status of the competitors was paramount to the success of the
programme. This ensured that the audience identified with the programme as
something any Saturday dancer might aspire to. Morley’s understanding of what
the public wanted as entertainment was uncanny; in 1951 he launched the first
Miss World competition, which survives to this day and in 1961 he led Mecca
into commercial bingo,
Mecca, Morley and bingo
As with his astuteness in spotting that Mecca dancing could be exploited on the BBC
(episodes were broadcast from Mecca ballrooms and thus provided Mecca with free
publicity), Morley had also noticed the massive popularity of the ‘tombola clubs’ at
Butlins holiday camps (Gibbs, 1999). As a Mecca board member, when the
contentious Betting and Gaming bill was published in 1959 Eric Morley seems to
have spotted that government assertions that commercial gaming would not be
profitable under the provisions of the bill were incorrect. In moving Mecca into
commercial bingo Morley may have benefited from his close association with the
Chairman of Mecca, Carl Heimann, who had a longstanding friendship with Billy
Butlin, chair of the Butlins holiday camps:
When he went round the dance halls, I was always with him; no matter what he said, I
was always free. The rows I had behind the scenes with girlfriends, breaking dates
because of this, I would not like to repeat. I was always free for Carl Heimann and thus
it was that in a five-year apprenticeship I learned more about the business than I would
have done in twenty years under normal conditions. (Gibbs, 1999)
Butlins campers played tombola (bingo) with the proceeds going to charity. This
was not a small-scale activity. Camps had to provide marquees capable of seating
up to 500 players at a time and would run two three-hour sessions daily (Gibbs,
1999; Butlins Memories, http://www.butlinsmemories.com/entertainment.htm). The
commercial potential of the tombola played by the patrons of holiday camps was
evident from the proceeds of the games, some £50,000 annually, that Butlins
donated to charity.2 While there is no surviving evidence that Mecca was actively
seeking changes to the gaming laws in the period before the 1960 Betting and
Gaming Act, both Butlins and Warners holiday companies were engaged in





























proceeds of the game and wanted to be sure that bingo could be played in clubs
that were an adjunct to their holiday camps. Committee sessions and one vote were
delayed so that Billy Butlin could meet with the Secretary of State3 and his
concerns were brought to the committee by the Under-Secretary of State who was
piloting the legislation through the Commons. It seems likely that the board of
Mecca were aware of what was going on between the holiday camp companies and
the government4 and as Morley took charge of the bingo operations from the start,
in a very hands-on way, his interest in this new venture seems to have been based
on a hunch that it would be a success.
During this period the far larger Rank Group was the main competitor and
threat to Mecca, and made aggressive attempts to take over the company. Rank was
far slower than Mecca in exploiting bingo, even though the company’s leisure
interests were largely concentrated in cinemas and audiences were declining (Spraos,
1962). Rank group had a more diverse portfolio, with engineering and reprographics
alongside cinema and film interests and perhaps this delayed and slowed the group’s
adoption of bingo. However, it seems reasonable to consider the personal impact on
Lord Rank of the move by the company he chaired into commercial gambling, as it
sits in some contrast to the flamboyant determination to entertain the masses
demonstrated by Eric Morley and supported by the board of Mecca. Lord Rank was
a leading lay Methodist and Treasurer of the Home Mission Department who had
described bingo as ‘a rather dreary game that does no real harm’ (The Times, 5 July
1962, p. 6). This was not the view of senior Methodists who said that far from being
a matter of little significance it was a real concern to their members and, ‘we have
conveyed this concern to the Home Mission Department and to Lord Rank’. The
Home Mission Department of the Methodist church defended Lord Rank
vigorously in a press release:
The department is fully convinced of Lord Rank’s integrity and that his opinion that
bingo is a harmless amusement is a sincere conviction. The department moreover agrees
that the guidance given on such questions is a matter for personal decision and should
not be regarded as in any way a condition of membership of the church . . . Mainly
because of the eminence of the person concerned the particular question has caused real
anxiety, but we should be prepared to defend the right of any individual to act according
to his conscience. (The Times, 28 June 1962)
Dr Donald Soper led those Methodists who did not agree with the Home Mission
Board that individuals had a right to act according to their conscience, providing
they exhibited an ardent faith in God:
I am not being flippant. I hope we shall not involve ourselves in an attitude of
acceptance of the theology which lies behind what I believe to be the delinquency of
Lord Rank. (The Times, 5 July 1962)
While the anxiety of the Methodists over an individual’s actions was not a
widespread feature of the debate on the social ills caused or exacerbated by gaming,
it is noticeable that despite adequate liquidity for expansion the Rank group
concentrated on less contentious leisure areas and relegated bingo largely to spare
capacity in its cinemas, giving the impression that the ‘bingo and dance’ chain
soubriquet enjoyed by Mecca was not sought by Rank. Nevertheless, Mecca’s bingo-





























to purchase the smaller group. Certainly there appeared to be a very real enmity
between the board of Mecca and Rank, with the flamboyance of Carl Heimann and
Eric Morley standing in sharp contrast to the sobriety of Lord Rank. Annual
General Meetings of Mecca were often enlivened by digs at the Rank group; ‘the
cinema people. I never hear that they are doing all that well with their wonderful
cinemas’, with such comments applauded by attending shareholders (Economist, 27
June 1964, p. 1510).
Strategic vision and the Mecca brand
That Mecca was preparing to expand shortly after the Betting and Gaming Bill was
presented in parliament can be surmised from the announcement in early 1960 of a
substantial rights issue. This would allow the company freedom to invest new capital
quickly without resorting to the banks and financial institutions that might restrict
their freedom and slow down their progress. The rights issue would increase the
authorised capital available to the company to £3 million, a substantial sum in 1960.
Leisure firms often grow through takeover, vertical integration within a market
sector, or through diversification. While Mecca had followed these strategies since
the 1920s the move into gaming moved the company’s diversification and takeover
onto a new scale.5
Some leisure industries offer superb cash-flow opportunities, bingo being a case
in point. Players do not buy bingo cards on credit and the nature of gambling
encourages both return visits and re-staking of winnings; thus once bingo was
introduced to the Mecca group it rapidly became central to the group’s ability to
expand by supporting both cash-flow and profitability. Thus in a diverse group cash-
flow from cash-rich areas of the company can be used to support les cash-rich areas
of the group. Mecca’s slow but steady growth in the period up to 1959 had been
mainly achieved through diversification into related catering, dance industry supplies
and music management businesses, with takeovers being of less significance in the
growth of the group. After the passage of the Betting and Gaming Act (1960) and the
concomitant move by Mecca into bingo acquisition of venues and conversion to
bingo became the main focus of the company’s strategy and the pace of growth
increased dramatically.
Whilst the acquisition of substantial amounts of new capital by Mecca indicated
that expansion was planned, their move into bingo in January 1961 was at first
confined to afternoon games in existing dance facilities, and not to wholesale conver-
sion of properties into what were described by Mecca as bingo casinos. As property
prices were relatively low during this period, and the purchase and conversion of a
substantial cinema into a bingo casino generally cost considerably less than £20,000,
the additional £3m of capital would allow rapid and extensive expansion into this field
of operation.6 The change in the law also encouraged existing mass-market leisure
entrepreneurs such as Rank, ABC, Mecca and Essoldo into rapid development of
gaming activities; this in turn increased the respectability of gambling, and
encouraged the rapid development of national gaming brands as pioneered byMecca.
Glamour and glitz
The key selling point of Mecca dancing was affordable glamour. Mecca halls were





























tunes. Mecca dance halls were part of mass popular culture; places that attracted
people by bringing the glitz of Hollywood to small towns like Harlesden. This
strategy had worked well for Mecca and the move to bingo was not seen as a move
downmarket. Until 1966 all Mecca bingo venues were styled, ‘Mecca Casinos’, while
the group’s casino gaming was run by Mecca’s Craywood Club subsidiary. Mecca
offered a wide range of attractions to highlight the glamorous and casino-like
elements of spending time and money playing bingo. Callers and staff wore evening
dress or suits and venues were stylish and comfortable. Mecca regularly recruited the
best-known celebrities to call games of bingo. These included Diana Dors (who was
paid £300 cash per appearance), Cassius Clay, Tommy Steele, Lulu, Cilla Black,
Frankie Howard and even Miss World.
Until the law changed in 1968 there were well-publicised glamorous additional
prizes such as diamond necklaces, mink stoles and cruises along the French Riviera.
Until 1968 the regulation of commercial gaming was almost non-existent but
providers were not allowed to advertise and this restriction was strictly enforced.
Mecca did not need to advertise. Local and even national press were keen to cover
appearances by celebrities and access was guaranteed to reporters. Recent analysis of
promotions within casinos has largely concluded that these are ineffective in terms of
short-term profitability and in failing to improve consumer brand loyalty (Browne,
2001). However, given the rapid increases in profitability after turning to bingo and
the number of members Mecca bingo had in the early 1960s it does appear that
Mecca’s marketing techniques were satisfying ‘hedonic consumer needs’ (Lucas &
Bowen, 2002, p. 191). They achieved this through providing opportunities both to be
near celebrities and also offering the chance to access celebrity lifestyles through the
types of special prizes they offered which contrasted with the more mundane
offerings available from other providers (Sunday roast dinner, kitchen equipment
and vacuum cleaners) and it may be this element of their branding that made the
company so much more successful than competitors. Contemporary press reports
suggest that the Mecca name remained synonymous with quality entertainment even
as less salubrious operators of bingo were receiving adverse publicity for running
crooked games in dangerous facilities and with poor-quality prizes (Downs, 2009,
pp. 232–235). The Mecca name and reputation for honest dealing later gave the
company an undoubted advantage in the fight to prevent commercial bingo being
banned under the provisions of the 1968 Gaming Bill.
Strategy for maximising profitability
Despite starting bingo only in existing dance halls, as an adjunct to dancing Mecca
was considered by commentators in the financial press to be the market leader in the
provision of commercial bingo, and the rise in profits over the first 26 weeks of 1961,
probably as a result of seizing the opportunities offered by bingo, were a spectacular
£179,000 (32% over the year) compared with a rise of only £62,000 for the same
trading period before the introduction of bingo (The Times, 29 August 1961, p. 18).
This increase is striking since in 1959 Mecca’s profits only increased by 8% over the
previous year and in 1960 by 14%. The jump to a profit increase of 32% in 1961
signifies expansion of business of a magnitude not seen in the previous two years and
contemporary commentators noted that similar rates of increase were not being seen
in similar-sized competitor companies such as the Forte group (The Times, 29





























conversion of buildings into bingo casinos was started by Mecca. Although Mecca
had introduced bingo into most of its venues by June 1961 and was by that stage
acquiring buildings for conversion into bingo casinos, the advertisement of company
results, published in June 1961 did not trumpet this widespread introduction of
bingo, merely stating, ‘we have started bingo in our premises’ (Economist, 3 June
1961, p. 1038). This laconic announcement somewhat belies the impact of the
introduction of bingo to the profitability of the company.
The leaders of the bingo boom have been the Rank Organisation and Mecca, but it
seems to have influenced the results of Mecca more than those of Rank . . . Mecca’s
prospects still beckon . . . The news at the Rank Organisation is less encouraging [the
directors] forecast a fall in profits before tax from 6,451,000 to 6,000,000 in the year.
(Economist, 19 May 1962, p. 717)
By the end of 1961 Mecca had opened four purpose-built Mecca Casinos, carrying
the trusted Mecca brand image into commercial gambling; although casino is
something of a misnomer, the main type of gaming carried out on the premises was
bingo, with slot machines a supplementary attraction (Economist, 30 June 1962,
p. 1381).
The move to legal gaming, and the immediate adoption of bingo in particular, by
some mass leisure providers led to a product that was rapidly organised and codified
in terms of a mass market, where companies spent money on market research and on
introducing new technologies in order to produce efficiencies. The economies of scale
that had radically altered the supply of food and the mass catering run in the Mecca
ballrooms were applied to gambling, and the emergence of the Mecca chain of
gambling venues, with rapidly growing market share over the period 1961 to 1968
transformed an activity that had previously been extremely popular but of a local
nature into a national pastime. Even contemporary commentators were surprised at
the speed with which large chains established control over the commercial bingo
industry.
An interesting feature of the industry is the concentration of ownership into a relatively
few large groups, especially as this happened extremely early on in the development of
the bingo industry. (The Times, 23 October 1961, p. 16)
The game increased rapidly in popularity so that Mecca was using 50,000 books of
bingo cards a week (five cards per book and sold at about two shillings per book) by
the middle of February 1961, a mere six weeks after the change in the law allowed
commercial bingo to be established. The popularity and spread of the game through
the Mecca outlets can be illustrated by rising numbers of bingo books used, for by
June 1961 Mecca was selling 500,000 books per week and the average attendance at
Mecca bingo games was 150,000 players a day. The Economist (24 June 1961, p.
1347) estimated that the gross profit to a promoter like Mecca might be £2m per
annum. The slower start of the far larger leisure conglomerate, Rank, which had
introduced bingo to only 14 of its venues over the same period that Mecca had
established 40 outlets was reflected in Rank’s call for investment capital more than
12 months after Mecca had signalled a period of extremely rapid, capital intensive,
growth (Economist, 15 April 1960, p. 832).
The immediate commercial success of the game is indicative of a widespread





























The probable extent and popularity of housey-housey (tombola or lotto) before 1961
makes the rapid move into commercial bingo by large leisure groups a logical
business decision.7 Commercial bingo built on an existing player base. That base
appears to have been fairly evenly split between the genders (Cornish, 1978, pp. 112–
115). However, apart from holiday camps different non-commercial venues appear
to have attracted one gender over another. The CIU clubs (ex-services and
workingmen) were bastions of male bingo, often with a vulgar repartee
accompanying the games. The Catholic social clubs and other charitable games
were dominated by women players. The arrival of commercial bingo was at first an
afternoon-filler for venues such as cinemas and dance halls with spare capacity.
Women were more likely than men to have free time in the afternoon and this factor
rapidly made commercial bingo a predominantly feminine pursuit.
The clubs formed by Mecca Limited and the Rank Organisation, each of which has
premises, management, catering and capital to spare, lead the field . . . The problem of
expensive establishments left idle during the day is solved; Bingo has come to succour
them. (Economist, 24 June 1961, p. 1346)
As there was already a market for the game and the large leisure groups had a client
base likely to be familiar with the game from National Service, holidays at Butlins or
Warners, playing fund-raising games at Catholic social clubs or at workingmen’s
clubs, bingo made sound business sense. Furthermore, bingo had the three
components that have been identified as essential to making any gaming product
successful in the market for commercial leisure. These are that it has to be simple to
play and easy to understand. There must be a significant jackpot, of which the public
is aware, and there must also be a realistic chance of winning one of a large number
of smaller prizes; bingo fitted the bill, in a way that traditional betting did not and it
may be this that is the reason why betting seems not to have increased after
legalisation while commercial bingo found a ready market.8
Market domination
While dancing remained Mecca’s core business in the early 1960s Mecca was
concerned with providing mass entertainment as profitably as possible, and the
significance of bingo to such endeavour was rapidly apparent to both the board of
the company and to financial analysts:
New types of entertainment in this country can bring a fast return to companies aware
of the change in public tastes. Mecca, one of the first to introduce bingo into its dance
halls has reported an increase in group trading profits for the first 26 weeks of the
current year . . . Bingo is the unknown quantity in the groups profits . . . Without doubt
there is enormous potential in bingo today, not only for the organisers but also for the
printers. (The Times, 29 September 1961, p. 18)
That commercial bingo provision expanded swiftly is illustrated by government
figures showing that there were over 12,000 commercial bingo clubs within two years
of the Betting and Gaming Act with 14,324,081 members and annual revenue of
£11.7m. This figure is likely to be only part of a larger total as the government made
no attempt to calculate how many games of bingo were being played in pre-existing





























As Mecca continued its expansion it was also increasingly competing with the
similarly sized Forte group of companies. The Forte group offered both a threat and
an opportunity to Mecca. The threat was of a hostile bid from Forte, while the
opportunity was the chance to acquire a ready-made addition to the Mecca portfolio
that dovetailed with the group’s current interests and expansionary plans. The battle
between Forte and Mecca, both major players in the leisure industry, offers a model
of the takeovers in the commercial leisure industry that ensured market
concentration in the provision of commercial leisure. In 1961 the tantalising
prospect of a merger between the privately owned Forte group and Mecca set up a
surge in the share prices but the deal came to nothing. Charles Forte wanted cash,
not Mecca ‘A’ shares for his empire, and Mecca’s accountants found it difficult to
agree a value for an unlisted company.10 While the bid for the Forte Group failed,
Mecca had clearly signalled its intention to increase profits through growth, by
acquiring companies whose holdings fitted in with Mecca’s portfolio of interests. The
pace of acquisitions over 1961 pushed up the value of fixed assets owned by Mecca
by 51%, pointing to the speed with which the company was expanding. The growth
of Mecca in the early 1960s was almost entirely due to the concentration on
expanding into bingo. However, this rapid growth and its allied increase in profits
had the potential to be rather a house of cards as it was built on increasing the size of
the group very rapidly and was not necessarily the result of economies of scale being
achieved in any sustained way as would be expected from mergers and acquisitions
announced in the latter part of the twentieth century.
The company was clearly using the popularity of bingo as a means of
underpinning its dance and leisure interests. Bingo fitted well with the Mecca
market position, offering a glamorous brand of mass entertainment and Mecca
rapidly positioned itself as the dominant force amongst providers of commercial
bingo, with Rank, Essoldo and ABC following. This top-down domination of
commercial gambling by large conglomerates at such an early stage in a new industry
is the opposite of the way businesses usually develop. The pattern of rapid expansion
into bingo by large organisations strongly suggests that there was a degree of
forward planning by the existing leisure groups either before the law changed or
immediately after they realised the potential of the Betting and Gaming Act (1960).
Mecca and the holiday camp providers, whose lobbying activities in 1959 and 1960
indicate that they were clearly aware of the commercial potential of bingo, seem to
have spotted the opportunities offered by the change in the law before it occurred
and were ready to move rapidly. Other leisure groups, including Rank, seem to have
seen the trend as it started and moved into bingo immediately but less
comprehensively than Mecca, increasing their capitalisation as 1961 progressed to
allow for more rapid expansion into this new area of business.
Profits
According to the Chairman’s annual report to shareholders Mecca’s business
improved generally in 1963, but most of the improvement in profitability was
concentrated in the dance hall and casino area of the group. The significance of the
continuing rise in profits remained important to the market and assured investors of
the underlying strength of the company. In an advertisement in the financial press
Mecca revealed that it was to revalue its portfolio of assets. This statement was the





























company with additional capital. The market would have understood these
statements as indicative of Mecca’s increased expansion aims and would have
been looking for a big merger to be on the cards, either in the form of hostile bids for
Mecca or by Mecca. Rank was also expanding its interests rapidly but unlike Mecca
was not concentrating on core competencies in the leisure sector. The sheer scale and
diversity of Rank in the early 1960s may be the reason that the company was slower
to exploit the potential of commercial bingo. The strength of Rank was a real threat
to the smaller but aggressive Mecca Group. It was to be expected that Rank would
attempt to acquire Mecca; both groups were growing and the Rank organisation was
cash rich as well as the most powerful leisure group in the country. Rank bid £30
million for Mecca, which easily saw off the attempted coup. The Mecca directors
‘Refused to part with the information Rank were seeking . . . as they thought it was
not in the company’s interests to do so’ (The Times, 9 June 1964, p. 16).
The Rank offer was generous and illustrates just how successful Mecca was. Its
pace of expansion made Mecca a real threat to Rank in some areas, especially in the
mass-market entertainment business. By the early 1960s cinema attendances were
declining rapidly (Spraos, 1962) and Rank’s leisure interests were heavily
concentrated on its chain of cinemas. That Mecca was considered a prize by Rank
is indicated by the offer of 25% above the market price for Mecca; valuing the
ordinary shares at 78s. as opposed to the stock market price of 54s. 6d (Economist,
13 June 1964, p. 1276). Had the bid been accepted the board of Mecca would have
benefited to the tune of £4 million each, a substantial sum upon which to retire in
1964. What other features Rank included in the bid are not known but are likely to
have been generous. There may have been sweeteners for the individual directors of
Mecca, with senior positions in the Rank organisation available, but the downside of
accepting the bid was that Mecca directors would not have the power over the
direction of the business that they had while Mecca remained an independent group.
The chairman of Mecca, Carl Heimann, described the Rank bid as ‘impertinent’; he
‘foresaw the danger of recommending to our shareholders something that 90% were
not likely to accept’ (Economist, 27 June 1964, p. 1510). There was much applause at
his comments, especially at his jibes at Rank, ‘the cinema people. I never hear that
they are doing all that well with their wonderful cinemas’ (Economist, 27 June 1964,
p. 1510). That there might be other predators after Mecca was also of concern to the
board; Chairman Carl Heimann insisted that:
If this jewel is to be sold it must be paid for in money. Not in paper money that can
change value in the Stock Exchange in a matter of hours. If I am to gamble in shares I
prefer to gamble in Mecca shares. (The Times, 23 June 1964, p. 18)
This is an interesting attitude, as Mecca made all of its acquisitions through the
transfer of non-voting Mecca ‘A’ shares to the owners of the businesses they
acquired.
Vertical integration
While Mecca was expanding its empire through bingo, the game was also having an
effect on other industrial sectors. The printers who were producing books of bingo
tickets were booming, and were reporting the need to increase production as demand





























demand led to the creation of new jobs, mainly for women. Most of the bingo cards
were produced at 10 plants in the north-west and the plants were not keeping up with
demand despite overtime being worked. The solution was to introduce a housewives’
shift. At one Manchester plant there was a four-ton backlog which new workers, all
part-time female employees, would clear by assembling the sets and packing them for
despatch (The Times, 25 August 1961, p. 5). Demand for bingo books continued to
rise, to such an extent that a year later the President of the Board of Trade praised
the efforts of bingo book printers in assisting the manufacturing sector. In response,
Labour MP Mr Boyden, pointed out during Parliamentary questions to the
President of the Board of Trade that, ‘A large body of opinion is disturbed by the
Government encouraging gambling’ (The Times, 27 July 1962, p. 8). Mecca may
have suffered from interruptions to its supply of bingo books due to increasing
demands made on printers, or it may simply have been following its established
strategy as in December 1964 it acquired a 51% stake in the largest printer of bingo
tickets in the United Kingdom, thus ensuring that it could always guarantee delivery
on time and at a good price whilst inconveniencing rival bingo operators. As well as
controlling supplies of bingo tickets Mecca was investing in the development of
‘sophisticated new bingo equipment’ (The Times, 16 June 1965, p. 18). The type of
equipment being developed and acquired allowed fast, mechanised games to be
played during the intervals of standard games. Because of the rapid rate of play and
as different rules applied to the distribution of prizes during such games, the profits
to the company were greater. Mecca was also interested in the development of
systems that allowed the main games to be called faster, as the quicker the game the
more games per session, the more exciting the product to the consumer. These were
typical Mecca solutions to the problems of expansion: seeking to control suppliers
through acquisition and encouraging innovation so that the company remained
ahead of competitors. Mecca had used just such tactics in establishing domination
over commercial dancing.11
Regulation and repression
It is clear that by 1965 bingo was both a popular pastime and an equally popular
investment opportunity. However, there was no regulatory framework in place to
control bingo clubs, casinos or the myriad of smaller gaming clubs operating across
Britain in the period 1961 to 1968. This regulatory shortfall allowed organised crime
to move into gaming, running protection rackets and using clubs as a means of
laundering money (Downs, 2009, pp. 124–125). Mecca itself was not immune to
threats from protection racketeers and Mecca employees were found to be running
lucrative scams in some establishments. The existence of criminal activity within
Mecca was something that the company downplayed; insisting that there was no
problem at large, well managed clubs and that any new legislation should be directed
at the smaller clubs.
By 1965 Mecca was producing better results than its competitors in the mass
leisure market, largely because its dominance of commercial bingo gave the group an
advantage over competitors.12 Mecca bingo clubs had 2.5 million members, and the
group had a presence in most provincial towns. Certainly by 1965 Mecca needed to
make the most of any opportunities for profit from its gambling operations as the
Labour government was prepared both to tax and to legislate against the gaming





























Despite the legislative change in the offing Mecca continued to have ambitious
expansion plans, and apart from detailing new bingo casinos, gaming clubs, skating
rinks and other leisure venues that the company planned to open in 1966 Mecca
announced a move into mail order, holiday travel and personal insurance markets.
The optimism of Mecca in the face of changes to its operating environment was in
large part due to the certainty of the board that society was changing and that
commercially provided leisure would be required fill the free time of the mass of the
people.
Surely more and more people will enjoy greater prosperity together with shorter
working hours, and this will give us even greater opportunities to cater for their leisure
time, as well as, in many of our branches, during their working hours. (Economist, 9 July
1966, p. 188)
The attraction of commercial gaming as a leisure opportunity to large sections of the
population was perhaps that the majority felt that they were not threatened with the
loss of jobs and security, and they were therefore now at liberty to challenge old
boundaries and adopt a new way of living and leisure. As far as Mecca was
concerned, offering gambling amongst its leisure activities was extremely profitable;
by 1966 bingo was contributing 28% (£827,639) of the profits of the group
(Economist, 9 July 1966, p. 188).
Declining profits
By 1967 it was becoming clear that tax changes were leading to results that were
significantly worse for the group; there was an actual loss; group profits fell by
£15,000. The significance of the figure is not the relatively small amount of the loss,
but the impact such a loss had on the image of the company as a vehicle for growth.
However, the figures reflect a full year’s impact of Selective Employment Tax and
Bingo Gaming Licence Duty, which in the case of Mecca amounted to £400,000.
Despite the necessarily upbeat nature of the Chairman’s review the dividend was
reduced to 18%, plus scrip shares, a move not appreciated by the financial press.
The carrot from Mecca of a one-for-twenty scrip issue was not enough to stop the ‘A’
shares sliding 1s. to 15s. 7½d. after yesterday’s results . . . Trading profits, in fact,
inched ahead, even after absorbing some £400,000 SET and bingo and gaming licence
duties.13 With Mecca’s formidable gearing, any sizable profit upturn shows through
sharply in earnings, but the other side of the coin is the heavy interest burden.[14] . . . At
present the 5.8% yield is some consolation but with a P/E ration of around 15½ the
shares are hardly alluring. (The Times, 11 May 1968, p. 12)
The losses were made despite the fact acknowledged by the press that, ‘Bingo is still,
of course, profitable. Mecca, which gets nearly thirty per cent of its profits from
bingo, appears to make over £10,000 profit per hall’ (Economist, 1 July 1967).
The loss of investment allowance relief and higher interest and depreciation
charges reduced the amount available for shareholders, as Mecca had not passed on
most of the company’s increased costs to the punters (Economist, 6 July 1968). The
group made the best of a difficult trading situation, and properties were revalued at
the end of 1967, giving the group an unearned £1.5m bonus, while it reported a first





























set to be a good year. In the ability to revalue properties Mecca was helped by its
longstanding strategy of vertical integration and the more recent decision to expand
rapidly into the development of bingo casinos as the company had acquired an
extensive portfolio in a wide range of locations. Mecca’s property holdings included
prime high street sites and industrial buildings and its manufacturing and supply
outlets were less affected than its leisure and service operations by the tax changes.
Mecca remained upbeat because it would have been aware by the summer of 1968
when it reported the 1967 results to shareholders that the legislative changes
appeared to be potentially less damaging than feared to the company’s long-term
viability, whilst almost certainly making life far more difficult for independent
operators. The independent bingo operators were less likely to have the resources
necessary to cope with new taxes, the potential demands of the proposed Gaming
Board of Great Britain or of additional safety regulations local councils were
increasingly imposing on bingo clubs as part of planning conditions.
Commercial bingo under threat
Mecca had profited more than any other commercial bingo operator during the
bingo boom of 1961 to 1964 and was praised by commentators for having survived a
period of difficult trading conditions brought about through changes to employment
tax, the introduction of gambling tax and the ending of investment allowances and
the threat of the introduction of stringent controls on gaming as a result of its vision
and diversity (The Times, 27 September 1968). By 1968 England was considered to be
a gambling paradise, with more than 1000 casinos legally operating nationwide.
However, later that same year, the Gaming Act (1968) was passed. It was designed to
rid the country of the majority of casinos, while heavily taxing the ones that
continued running. Mecca, along with all commercial gaming operators, entered a
new era in 1968, facing legislation that was designed to severely limit its freedom to
exploit the desire of the masses for a bit of a flutter.
Eric Morley was central in rebranding Mecca to ensure that it survived the
legislative changes. As soon as the Labour government announced its intention to
legislate to bring commercial gaming under control Mecca took rapid and effective
action. The Mecca-owned newspaper, Dance and Bingo News, carried listings of each
Mecca venue; Mecca Casinos vanished to be replaced with Mecca Social and Bingo
Clubs. The idea of bingo as a mainly social activity was heavily pushed by Eric
Morley, and as he had control of the bingo operators’ trade body his stance that
bingo was played as an adjunct to socialising rapidly became the accepted line of all
operators. In October 1967 the formal campaign began, reported as ‘Council of War
as bingo owners fear Government Restrictions’ (The Times, 11 October 1967).
Although the meeting was organised by the National Association of Bingo Clubs,
they had the astuteness to invite and involve non-affiliated clubs in their campaign.
This allowed them to present a united front to the government. The main concern
was that Roy Jenkins (then Home Secretary) would bring forward legislation of a
nature that would severely restrict the clubs. The owners wanted to: ‘Impress on the
Government that bingo clubs represent a social service . . . it is in the National
interest that bingo is recognised as performing a social function’ (The Times, 11
October 1967).
This reference includes the now common notion that bingo is an activity with a





























as first and foremost a gambling activity, undertaken for the thrill of winning, and
although Mecca had included the social function of its clubs in press releases before
this date, it had always emphasised the name ‘Mecca Casino’ and highlighted the
glamour of spending time in a Mecca venue. Before 1966 such sources as press
releases to local papers were used by the bingo clubs as a means of publicising large
wins and emphasising the thrills of the gamble. There was serious concern amongst
bingo club proprietors about the new gaming laws; particularly as the proposals
originally circulated by the Home Office appeared to outlaw most types of
commercial bingo. Owners of large halls were ‘preparing a joint defence of their
interests’ and set about transforming public and parliamentary opinion of bingo
(The Times, 11 October 1967). The aim of a unified defence of bingo interests was
undoubtedly protection of the annual turnover of commercial bingo, amounting to
£335m per annum in 1967 (The Times, 11 October 1967). The bingo clubs cited the
strength of the opposition from the churches and Labour government to bingo as a
prime reason for the need to unite in its defence: ‘There are a lot of lobbies who may
endeavour to make legislation highly restrictive’ (The Times, 11 October 1967). The
bingo clubs were particularly aware of the strength of the Churches Council on
Gambling, which they viewed as their principal adversary in the lobbying process.
Undoubtedly, a leading figure in the concerted response of the gambling industry
to the proposals of Harold Wilson’s government to control commercial gambling
was Eric Morley. He co-ordinated the unified approach of the bingo industry and
tried hard to persuade the casino operators to work with the bingo industry. At first
the gaming industry (bingo and casinos) stood together against the government. Eric
Morley was one-half of a partnership representing the gaming industry to the
government with specific responsibility for bingo. However, casino operators were
not keen to be associated with bingo:
Bingo players are the kind of people who have to get up early in the morning and get to
work or get someone else off to work – and usually go straight home when the bingo
ends. (The Times, 21 May 1966)
The casino operators decided to fight for casino gambling without bingo, leaving Eric
Morley to represent both members of the National Association of Bingo Clubs and
non-aligned bingo operators whom the NABC allowed a voice on its board during the
crisis over the survival of commercial bingo. Morley’s publicity initiative, involving a
punishing schedule of travel around the country promoting bingo to MPs, was almost
certainly responsible for the creation of an image of bingo as a ‘neighbourly game
played for modest stakes’ (Sir Stanley Raymond, chair of the Gaming Board of Great
Britain, The Times, 12 December 1969). Mecca had invested millions in establishing
commercial bingo and with an estimated annual profit of £10,000 per site at stake
Mecca had no desire for the game to be regulated out of existence as a result of
concerns about excessive gambling amongst women or links between bingo and orga-
nised crime (Economist, 1 July 1967, p. 63). When the Gaming Bill was first published it
was drafted in such as way that commercial bingo could not have continued.
Morley co-ordinated a lobbying campaign of ministers, standing committee
members and the press that emphasised the difference of bingo and the bingo
industry to other forms of gaming. His success resulted in government concessions to
bingo that allowed commercial bingo to remain profitable although somewhat ema-





























The casinos were hard hit by the 1968 legislation, sometimes described as the most
draconian gaming legislation in the world (Dickerson, 1984, p. 16). Only 121 casinos
survived from the more than 1000 running before the Gaming Act (1968) came into
force and casino operators may have been left regretting their attitude towards bingo
and its players in light of the more favourable treatment meted out to that game.
The main impact on bingo was the advent of an intrusive and powerful regulator
and that the large link games that had become a hugely popular feature of bingo
were banned. The Gaming Board for Great Britain was created as a result of the
1968 Act, its remit being the apparently benign one of keeping under review ‘The
extent and character of gaming’ (Moody, 1974, p. 6). However others see the checks
and controls instituted by James Callaghan and the Home Office in 1968 as ‘The
British Gaming Board under the 1968 Act constitutes the most autocratic British
institution since the Star Chamber’ (Skolnik, 1978, p. 340).
After the 1968 Gaming Act came into force Mecca bingo concentrated on re-
branding itself as a social activity, far removed from gambling. Mecca’s position as
market leader and reputation for honest dealing helped the Mecca brand of bingo
survive the attention of the newly-created regulatory body, the Gaming Board for
Great Britain (GBGB) with relative ease. The board of Mecca continued optimistic
about the opportunities available for the company despite the difficulties imposed by
the new legislation and accompanying regulator:
The first quarter’s trading results for 1969 fortify our belief that we can overcome these
taxation difficulties this year and look forward to the future with confidence. The
keynote is expansion, not only in our existing premises and additional establishments,
but also, and in the main, by the acquisition of other businesses in our industry.
(Economist, 21 June 1969, p. 76)
Mecca remained vulnerable to takeover though, and having benefited from the
opportunities available during the virtually unregulated ‘Golden Age’ of commercial
bingo, gave in gracefully when in 1970 Grand Met paid £33m for the company.
Conclusion
It has been noted that leisure companies that moved into commercial gaming were
aware of the moral difficulties of selling gambling:
A characteristic feature of the approach of these providers to gambling is the emphasis
on developing it as a social leisure experience. They aim to change its image from that of
a downmarket, somewhat disreputable activity, to that of a respectable and socially
rewarding one. (Haywood et al., 1989, p. 137)
Mecca in fact did not adopt this strategy at first. The company instead
concentrated on moving part of its existing customer base to bingo, selling Mecca
glamour through gambling. In this Mecca was hugely successful, and became the
leading commercial bingo operator as a result. However, by 1965 it was clear that
maintaining this strategy would result in damage to the Mecca group and it was at
this stage Mecca adopted the idea that bingo was a social activity first with gambling
as a supplementary activity. The election of a Labour government in 1964 and
realisation that the Churches Council on Gambling was heavily influencing Labour
policy on commercial gaming clearly influenced Mecca in changing the name of its





























part of the development of commercial bingo has been tied to controlling the image
of the game in order to persuade the public, regulators and legislators that the
product on offer is socially acceptable; the responsible face of gambling.
Mecca was in some ways very similar to other leisure companies of the era, but
while competitors had similar core competencies Mecca had additional competitive
competence that allowed it to become the leading provider of commercial bingo.
Mecca was able to reduce operational costs and the effectiveness of its bureaucratic
procedures through vertical integration. Having obtained a source of capital prior to
the opportunity for expansion Mecca could rapidly increase market share while
competitors played catch-up. Mecca also benefited from a loyal customer base, good
employee relations and innovative research and innovation strategy which also
added to its competitive edge.
The importance of Mecca to the development of a commercial bingo industry that
filled a demand previously serviced by the piecemeal availability of ostensibly
charitable bingo games should not be under-estimated. Rankwas a far larger company,
but followed where Mecca led. Eric Morley saw an opportunity and the board of
Mecca were prepared to follow his hunch. Eric Morley’s claim that he brought
commercial bingo to Britain in 1961 cannot be gainsaid (The Sun, 23 February 1974).
Had commercial bingo not been developed so rapidly by the Mecca group, with its
desire to bring affordable glamour to the masses, then the type of commercial bingo
that was stifled byMeccamight have dominated themarket. That is, commercial bingo
operated by single entrepreneurs or small chains, in venues that were lacking in
facilities and devoid of glamour, with loose canvas seating and nicotine-stained walls
and described as ‘a captive market for gaming and bargain pushing’ (Report of the
GBGB, 1969, p. 27). Walton (1978, 1983, 1992, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2004, 2007), writing
on Blackpool, has shown that the working classes were not passive consumers of
leisure; theymade demands that resulted in pleasure palaces by the sea, for fairground-
type customary leisure to travel to the seaside, and these demands were met by
entrepreneurs of popular leisure. Themass leisure market was, in some part, created by
the masses; they exerted a degree of popular control over the type of leisure available.
The commercialisation of bingo is an aspect of this development of mass, commercial
leisure; driven by demand from below but, by the post-war era, increasingly managed
by and profitable for, large, national organisations. A popular, customary pursuit, that
was part of working class leisure life, was legalised by the Betting and Gaming Act
(1960) leading to successful commercialisation of a product that is surviving and
adapting into the twenty-first century, with the Mecca brand still a leading player.
Notes
1. Legislation to control and contain off-course betting, lotteries and sweepstakes was
passed in 1823, 1845, 1856 and 1906.
2. HC Deb. 1959–60, 623, no 109, col. 2253.
3. PP Sessional Papers 1959–60, I–XV, 1075, col. 1149.
4. Stg Co Deb 1959–60 Betting and Gaming Bill, I–XV, 1075, col. 1149.
5. Vertical integration is the term used to describe the degree to which a company owns its
suppliers/buyers. This can have a significant impact on a business with regard to costs
and differentiation as well as having strategic implications. Achieving as much vertical
integration as possible is an important management strategy for growing a company.
6. During the period of rapid expansion Mecca never paid more than £35,000 for a
property, and always paid in equity not cash, and when the company altered its





























conversions was generally less than £10,000 per site, although for some large properties it
could be as much as £50,000.
7. As the result of an enquiry made in 1960 it is known that tombola was played regularly in
the 3500 Working Men’s Clubs registered with the Clubs and Institutes Union (CIU) and
that of the 2,200,000 members of working men’s clubs 80% regularly played tombola.
Tombola (housey-housey) was a popular fund-raiser in Conservative clubs. They had
about 400,000 members and 50% of these were reported to regularly play tombola. There
were also 1146 British Legion clubs in 1960, accounting for 250,000 members and all of
these clubs ran regular tombola sessions (Payne and Others vs Bradley, The Times Law
Reports, 17 February 1961, p. 22, column d).
8. This definition was established by the Henley Centre for Forecasting and GAH
Partnership Strategy in 1994.
9. CMND 2275 Report on Enquiry into Gaming Under Section 2 of the Finance Act 1963,
p. 6.
10. ‘A’ shares are shares without the voting rights that come with ordinary shares. In 1961
Mecca was estimated to be worth about £15 million.
11. By 1938 Mecca had control of 300 dance bands, as well as owning an agency that dealt
with all aspects of the dance hall business and commissioning and publicising new and
simpler dances that the masses would dance (Nott, 2002, p. 157).
12. Mecca ‘A’ shares were 21s. with a dividend yield of 6% and a P/E ratio of 18.5. The pre-
tax return on capital was 12.8% and although most of the increased profits were due to
takeovers and were not necessarily the result of growth with firm foundations (The
Times, 16 June 1965, p. 18, column d).
13. Selective Employment Tax (SET) had increased by 50% in 1966.
14. ‘Gearing is concerned with the relationship between the long term liabilities that a
business has and its capital employed. The idea is that this relationship ought to be in
balance, with the shareholders’ funds being significantly larger than the long-term
liabilities’. http://www.bized.ac.uk/compfact/ratios/gearing2.htm
Notes on contributor
Carolyn Downs is lecturer in socially responsible gambling and principal investigator on the
first qualitative study of gambling-related debt.
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